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C ommentators like to categorize American politics by space. The United States, we are told, is com-prised of conservative rural areas, liberal urban areas, and hotly contested suburbs. But just like
maps that color whole states red or blue, these labels paint a false uniformity. It’s the variation among
them we most need to see to understand political change.
Our divides are widening, and density is only part of the story. In some rural spaces, information-econo-
my consultants freelance using broadband. In other rural places, stressed moms drive miles for work
shi s that change without notice. The communities that fall between urban and rural are even more var-
ied in ways “suburban” doesn’t begin to capture. The suburbs conjures images of mown lawns and two-
car garages. But while some suburbs have subdivisions and golf courses, others have foreclosure-scarred
streets and strip malls. There are places where vacation bible school is thriving—and places where even
churches have closed.
 in 2018 thus shed little light. Atlantic Media’s  offered a little
more detail, categorizing congressional districts based on density ranges. According to ,
“sparse suburban” districts swung to Democrats in the midterms by more than any other category. “Rur-
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al-suburban mix” districts and “dense suburbs” were close behind. “Pure urban,” “urban-suburban,” and
“pure rural” districts saw smaller le ward shi s. But these labels still don’t show how fortune and hard-
ship shape the politics of a district.
To try and capture how they do, analysts like Dave Wasserman  to the divide between Whole Foods
and Cracker Barrel . In 2016, Donald Trump won 76 percent of counties with a Cracker Barrel
and just 22 percent of counties with a Whole Foods. That’s a vivid mental picture. But most of America
falls outside it. Roughly 200 of the 3,200-odd counties in the United States have a Whole Foods. No more
than 650 have Cracker Barrels. A swingy, politically diverse state like Pennsylvania has fourteen Whole
Foods, twenty- ve Cracker Barrels, and sixty-seven counties. Six Pennsylvania counties have both, and
forty-three have neither.
Here’s a better way to track hardship across space: SNAP-authorized dollar stores. There are over 
 in the United States, and about two-thirds of them are authorized to accept Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program payments. Each SNAP-authorized  re ects a series of
speci c locational assessments: that rent here is low, low-income demand is high, and the number of
folks on food stamps who will rely on this store for groceries will make up for the cost of stocking goods
that meet USDA authorization . It’s no surprise, then, that congressional districts with more
SNAP-authorized dollar stores are less well off, with lower life , lower educational attain-
ment rates, and lower median incomes.
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There are fewer SNAP-authorized dollar stores in dense districts in part because more people live within
range of any given store. But other factors are also responsible for keeping the number of dollar stores
low in some areas, including high retail rent, strong local merchants, and  that promote
better food options. Because SNAP-authorized dollar store locations crystallize all these dimensions,
classing districts by the number of stores they contain creates sets that are  than cate-
gorization by density, while still capturing density as a key component.
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This is evident in the above charts, which both utilize the Social Science Research Council’s income index
to measure wealth. The  rst chart groups districts by CityLab categories. As it shows, each CityLab cate-
gory includes districts with a wide range of median incomes. The second chart groups districts by the
number of SNAP-authorized dollar stores. It creates sets with a far smaller spread.
In the second chart, the dots’ colors re ect which party held the seat a er the 2016 election, conveying
the political stakes of hardship in non-urban America. There’s a clear pattern. Districts with many dollar
stores are more likely to be conservative.
That’s true even within suburban areas.Virginia’s second and eleventh congressional districts, for exam-
ple, are both classed by CityLab as “dense suburban.” But  to 2008-18 data, VA-11—Washington
D.C.’s bedroom suburbs—has only  ve SNAP authorized dollar stores. VA-02, home to Norfolk, Virginia
Beach, and the two poorest counties in Virginia, has forty-three. In VA-11, life is good. In VA-02, it’s not
great. The median household income in VA-02 is only two-thirds as high as in VA-11, and the portion of
adults with advanced degrees is less than half as high. In 2016 congressional races, Democrats carried
VA-11 by a forty-four point margin. Republicans took VA-02 by twenty-three points.
Rural America is no more uniform. Much like suburban districts, rural districts with fewer dollar stores
tend to be more af uent and less Republican. Consider, for example, New Hampshire’s second congres-
sional district. CityLab codes it as “pure rural,” and its population is dispersed. But it’s also relatively well
according
Roff. In NH-02—home to twenty-nine SNAP authorized dollar stores—less than 10 percent of children live
in poverty. Virginia’s ninth district is also “pure rural.” Here 24 percent of children live in poverty and the
median income is $44,000, not $73,000 like NH-02. Virginia’s ninth has 112 SNAP-authorized dollar stores.
Hillary Clinton won NH-02 by two points. Donald Trump carried VA-09 by forty-one points.
epublicans’ slow  in the kind of places dollar stores have colonized—more rural,
less wealthy, more white, more evangelical—stuttered with the 2008 recession but then af-
ter Barack Obama’s . Donald Trump’s campaign, with its populist rhetoric and rejection of Repub-
lican orthodoxy on trade and entitlements, furthered the trend. Trump earned a smaller vote share than
Mitt Romney in low-dollar-store districts, but made up for it in places where the number of dollar stores
is high.
The rural districts to the right of this chart have long been home both to voters who  on programs
like SNAP to help put dinner on the table, and to voters who  thoseprograms. The former tend to
vote Democrat when they vote at all. The latter are thisnation’s staunchest Republicans. In 2016, Donald
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Trump enough of the former that he might be their champion, or at least that Hillary Clinton
would never be, that he carried these districts by .
This chart shows the number of SNAP-authorized dollar stores for congressional districts, sorting each
district by its presidential votes in 2012 and 2016 and color-coding each by its 2016 congressional dis-
tricts. Starkly, the districts that Hillary Clinton sliced away from the Romney were systematically those
home to the fewest dollar stores. Surprisingly, Obama-Clinton districts cover a pretty broad range, in part
because there are a handful of heavily African American rural districts in the Deep South with high num-
bers of dollar stores. Meanwhile, the 2012 Obama districts that Donald Trump won over were largely in
the 30 to 60 dollar store band. These were New England and Midwestern districts with small cities and
waning numbers of union jobs.
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Above, we have mapped out how these districts voted in the midterms. Purple diamonds represent seats
that Democrats  ipped and orange ones represent seats that Republicans  ipped. At  rst glance, these
results might suggest Democrats increasingly speak mostly for places with low numbers of dollar stores.
The party entered the 2018 midterms holding two-thirds of the 218 districts with thirty or fewer stores,
and it picked up an additional twenty-nine seats in this category.  By comparison, Republicans went into
the midterms holding three-fourths of the 217 districts with over thirty SNAP-authorized dollar stores
and lost a net of just eleven seats in that range.
But Democrats  ipped few seats in high-dollar-store districts because they started from far behind. In
two dozen of them, Democrats did not even  eld candidates in 2016. But in 2018, that changed. The chart
above highlights those newly contested seats with diamonds. Most of them are disadvantaged rural dis-
tricts where Democrats have not been competitive since Ronald Reagan  rst won of ce. Many are south-
ern districts that went red as party positions on civil rights switched. In 2018, Democrats stepped back up
to compete in these places, and did so with a brand that is avowedly progressive on issues of
racial justice. These candidacies are a leading indicator of Democrats’ new dynamism in places far be-
yond af uent suburbs.
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But it isn’t just that more Democrats ran in dollar store country. The above plot shows congressional dis-
tricts where Democrats ran in both 2016 and 2018. Each dot’s color shows the party that held the district
going into the midterm election. Each dot’s location shows the magnitude of the congressional vote
swing. The breadth of the shi  is clear. Very few districts moved towards the GOP in 2018. Those that did
were almost entirely in (and remained in) Democratic hands. Rather, even in districts with many dollar
stores, congressional votes totals moved somewhere between a little and a lot towards the Democratic
candidate.In fact, in 2018, Democrats improved their vote share as much in high-dollar-store districts as
they did in ones with the fewest stores. The party’s vote share improved most in the mid-to-high dollar
store districts in between. They even managed to win in VA-02.
U p through the 2016 elections, the ongoing geographic concentration of prosperity drove a widen-ing political divide. Democrats were positioned as caring about the kinds of people who live in ur-
ban areas, and the kinds of poverty and inequality they face. That le  Democrats  to Republi-
can claims that they didn’t care about the kinds of people who live in small town and rural areas or the
hardships they face. The social infrastructure through which Democrats once made their case in dollar-
store country, like unions and working-class churches, was battered by the same grim trends that favored
dollar stores’ arrival.
So how did Democrats make a comeback? In place a er place, in the wake of Donald Trump’s election,
local progressives decided they could no longer wait for someone else to  x a political system they saw as
broken. They stepped forward, found each other, created and used online resources, and took 
political action. Where Democrats’ local infrastructure had most , the new presence was most
impactful.
New or re-energized progressive groups in red districts have repopulated local Democratic committees
and  the ecosystem for campaigns up and down the ballot. These groups aided candidate recruit-
ment and fundraising, knocked on doors and made calls, and encouraged campaigns to come hold
events in locales they might otherwise have skipped.
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Within Iowa’s deeply conservative fourth congressional district, for example, a dozen separate grassroots
groups joined the Indivisible network. Meanwhile, another new group (one not even listed on the Indivis-
ible site) helped Democratic candidate J.D. Scholten  a campaign stop in Pocahontas, Iowa, popula-
tion 1,700. The stop featured a rally with forty attendees as well as a coffee-shop phonebank. That may
not sound like a revolution, but it’s local activism like this that helped Scholten almost defeat   een-year
incumbent Steven King.
What happened in Scholten’s seventy-eight dollar store district is happening in places  across the
country. Regional politics have been renewed by activists’ passion, time, and treasure. They supported
Democratic candidates who ran for positions large and small—with locally framed messages to match. As
a result, GOP-skeptical  far outside metro cores found persuasive Democratic alternatives
in front of them.
The distance between countryside and country club has not collapsed. Choosing cans carefully on the
dollar store aisle to make sure you don’t go over your EBT limit remains a common experience in some
communities. It remains unknown in others. But Democratic organizing is now underway in local hands
in districts at both ends of this gulf, and across its vast middle. For Democrats, the task ahead is translat-
ing this into sustained electoral gains and  that will  the disparities dividing America.
host
like it
younger voters
policy action reduce
Lara Putnam and Gabriel Perez-Putnam (https://washingtonmonthly.com/people/lara-putnam-and-gabriel-perez-
putnam/)
© 2019 Washington Monthly.
